

Peace Operations

A Clausewitzian View

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
Peace Operations: Aim of these lectures

- Demonstrate the relevance of military theory for PKO
- Familiarise with three types of war theory:
Positive, Negative and Political
- Introduce Clausewitzian, political military theory
- Introduce “paradoxical triangle” analysis of wars
- Provide a political interpretation of “peacekeeping”
- Go through a Clausewitz’ “standstill in war” analysis
- Familiarise students with previous and current PSO doctrine in order to constructively question current PSO doctrine and its application

Peace Operations: Classification of wars

Wars listed by size (number of participants and area involved):


- Gang war (“Mafia war”)
- Tribal war
- Terrorist group war
- Guerrilla war
- Intra-state war
- War between states
- World war



(How large must groups be before their fighting constitutes a “war”?)

Peace Operations: Classification of wars

Wars listed by intensity (by number of dead)



Global Nuclear war	(all molten glass)
Total War	(all resources set in desperate battle)
War	
Low-intensity conflict	(occasional battles)
Armed surveillance	(arms used occasionally)
Cold war	(Undeclared war, Rivalry, no trust)
Cold peace	(Not war, little interaction or trust)

Where is the borderline between war and not war?

Peace Operations: Classification of wars

Wars listed by perceived main cause

- (Uprisings)
- Revolutionary wars (in connection with popular revolt)
- Colonial wars (to expand or hold an empire)
- Wars of liberation (from an Empire?)
- Wars of independence (successful Wars of liberation?)
- Anti-terrorist war (oppression or punitive war)
- Race wars (?)
- Holy wars (Crusades, “Jihad”?)
- (etc.)

Is there a relationship between cause, size and intensity?

“One mans terrorist, the other mans freedom fighter”, do you agree?
(morality and means)

Peace Operations: Classification of wars

Wars listed by main operational characteristic

- Wars of attrition
- Siege wars
- Partisan wars
- Guerrilla wars
- Counter-insurgency wars
- Peace Support Operations (?)
- (etc.)

Most wars have many of these characteristics, is the list useful for understanding war?

Peace Operations: Classification of wars

Wars listed by political motive

- Wars of independence (or liberation/secession)
- Colonial wars
- Border wars
- Punitive wars (indirect object, could be trade)
- Trade wars
- Rebellion
- Humanitarian Interventions
- Peace Enforcement (?)

Same problem as with “cause”, what is the political motive really?

Peace Operations: Three types of war theories

Negative theories

War is wholly destructive, no benefits from war

- * War is a sudden “madness”, a disease or anomaly
- * Example: Cultural / sexist theories

Positive theories

War is necessary and ultimately beneficial

- * War is per se unavoidable till a certain end state
- * Examples: Racist, fascist, cultural, communist, theories

Political theories

War is a political event (in cause, flow and outcome)

- * Varying degree of support for cultural/time differences
- * Examples: SunTsu, Machiavelli, Clausewitz

Peace Operations: Three types of war theories

	Positive	Negative	Political
WW1: Western Front 1914	Geopolitical: Great nations struggle for resources	A breakdown in culture, a infectious, popular hysteria about national glory, a madness	System of alliances triggered an unnecessary war as politicians had left control to military
Kosovo 1999	Western European civilisation (Christianity) vs. The Moslem World. (Serbianity vs. Musulman)	Centuries old hate dating back to 1389 and WW2 flaring up, these people are like that and have always been!	Ex-communist regime in Belgrade, corrupt and in trouble internally and externally gambles on war


Peace Operations: Three types of war theories

	Positive	Negative	Political
Vietnam 1965	The unavoidable battle between unstoppable historical forces, the post-Imperial phase, leading towards global rule of the proletariat	Western culture with its male dominance and destructive values, and US hate of communism, creates conflicts	US believing in “Domino theory” spread of communism dragged into colonial war, disabled US national control due to military/political failure
Keywords	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Greater forces - Unavoidable - Lead to higher level - Have positive end-state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emotive explanations - Disease-like - Peoples-focussed - Negative to war 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multiple actors - Leader-focussed - Who-earns-what explanations - Politics primarily

Peace Operations: Understanding Clausewitz

	“War is merely the continuation of politics by other means”
Positive Effects	Correct statement, “because the conflict between X and Y is what moves the World, war is unavoidable and the natural continuation of day-to-day politics”
Negative Effects	Wrong statement because war is deeply immoral. Evil Prussian Clausewitz think that war is a morally perfectly excusable replacement for politics, “if you can’t get your will, just kill”
Political theories	The start of wars, and the way wars are fought is not just madness and chaos, there is some order to it, and political motives and actions shape wars

Peace Operations: Defining War



1. Clausewitz' definition of war

“War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”

2. Another definition of war

“War is systematic use of deadly force between organised groups”


Systematic use = command relationship, structured violence

of deadly force = weapons used, casualties caused

between organised groups = both parties are structured groups

(People that haven't read Clausewitz's works often think that his theory is about war between states only)

Peace Operations: Defining War



For Clausewitz any war is defined in the relationship between three elements, each with characteristics that shape war:

The Population
*- violence, hate
and enmity*

The Government
Rationality

“Paradoxical Trinity”

The CO and his Army
Creative, within skills and chance

Peace Operations: Trinity - example 1

**WW1
1914**

Peoples of Western Europe, influenced by “Darwinistic” political ideas, sees each others as “null-sum” adversaries. Accustomed to many years of peace (but 1871-war) and colonial race (imperialism and racism as dominant ideas) they do not fear war.

Governments Sharing worldview with population, while perhaps more responsible than the (un-informed, un-travelled) population in general. Not in control of militaries.

Militaries accustomed to limited political oversight, to peace or easy colonial victories, and having applied industrial methods to warfare (the quick-mobilised mass-armies) the militaries sets off disaster by prompting early mobilisation¹⁴

Peace Operations: Trinity - example 2

Vietnam 1965	<p>People of US Initially in favour of hard response to Communist expansion, presently busy getting richer, and initially kept uninformed by Government, the population reacts to the war only late 1960s with confusion, not commitment.</p> <p>People of North Vietnam Initially proud of nationalist victory over French, then marginalised politically, militarised and radicalised by Government.</p> <p>People of South Vietnam In conflict between own unpopular government supported by France then the US, and ideals of national liberation as presented by the North, and dislike of communist repression as threatened by the North.</p>
	<p>Government of US Busy with growth and social reform, largely distrustful or uninterested in military affairs, and not willing to commit population.</p> <p>Government of North Vietnam Nationalist, radicalised, and determined with one war aim, to win South Vietnam. Willing to use any foreign support.</p> <p>Government of South Vietnam Unrepresentative, inept, corrupt, wholly dominated by desire to live well and by foreign advisors</p>
	<p>Military of US Indifferent to Vietnam, not willing to commit itself fully, occupied with Nuclear questions and doctrine allows itself to be dragged into Vietnam, where it tolerates political damaging political guidance.</p> <p>Military of North Vietnam Well-organised, experienced, well supported and in close support of Government.</p> <p>Military of South Vietnam Partly well-organised and well supported, but with incompetent leadership and at times low morale. (Fights like hell in 1975.)</p>

Peace Operations: Trinity - example 3

**Kosovo
1999**

People of The West Enraged by human suffering the populace (mostly) demands the atrocities stopped. (Rational interests: Avoid humiliation of NATO and the West, and keep refugees away)

People of Serbia Manipulated and bullied by the government the people readily subscribes to yet another war “unavoidable” war on them by evil West.

People of Kosovo Enraged by Serbian oppression, encouraged by Western diplomacy, by Serbian defeat in Bosnia, and by crumbling in Belgrade, supports their militia

Government of The West Casualty-shy, confused by the defeats in the Balkans, but aware of the necessity to maintain credibility, bungling negotiations with Serbia setting higher demands than they were ready to pay up on.

Government of Serbia Trying to survive, the dictator was in trouble. Negotiations demanded war criminals (= government) to be arrested in Serbia by NATO. Decided for last resort to keep in power, delete Kosovo, test West, unite Serbs (3rd time).


Government of Kosovo Not being fully formed, misinterpreting Western commitment, and not in control of its forces the escalation was not stopped.

Military of The West Casualty shy, confused by Bosnia, over-stretched and under-funded the military proposes limited action. (ref. Luttwak)

Military of Serbia Under strong control by Government, and self-confident by knowledge of Western incapacity reinforced by Russian and Chinese support the military obeys Government skilfully.


Military of Kosovo Outgunned and outmanoeuvred, unable to protect the population, the KLA opts for guerrilla against Serbia launched from Albania

Peace Operations: Clausewitzian theory 1



- (1) War serves – at least – initially a rational purpose for the organised group (state, tribe, etc.), thus the political and not the military leaders should be in charge of the highest (strategic) level of war.
- (2) War might be the best, possibly the only, way to serve the groups interests. War should not be the first resort, but not the last either.
- (3) The rationality of war makes the formulation of clear, stated war-aims possible. Cost/benefit-analysis can be made. War should be won fast and at lowest total cost.


Peace Operations: Clausewitzian theory 2



(4) Even if war is fought on a rational foundation, uncertainty, friction, luck, feelings and the personalities of the leadership limits the rationality. War started for rational purposes might degenerate into irrational ventures, and wars can be fought rationally for irrational purposes.

(5) Political, economic and diplomatic factors are integral to the war-fighting, possibly as or more important than the fighting itself. Military victory is not the aim by itself, but a means to an end. Only if followed up by political actions that makes the loser accept his defeat reaches the final aim of any war: A better peace.

Peace Operations: Clausewitzian theory 3



(6) War is here to stay. Politics may prevent wars, but not all wars forever.

(7) As parties attempt rationality before and under a war "deterrence" is possible, and an important determinant of the relationship between the parties as well as during the actual war-fighting.

Peace Operations: Theories explaining PSO

How does PKO “work” (effect where it is positioned)?

Positive theories

The superior strength and soundness of own PKO soldiers subdues primitive natives.

- * either racial/cultural “superiority” type explanation or
- * “PKO not worth the effort, we cannot prevent unavoidable war -- let them fight”

Negative theories

PSO is a medicine – “calms the nerves, cools the fever” of the warring parties. War is irrational, a disease, and the uninfected PSO troops are the “medicine”. PKO sending states moral and cultural soundness cures the fighting natives.

Explanation 1 and 2 depending merely on PSO troops “presence” to explain effect. As analytical tools to assist action they are worse than worthless and leads to failure in Bosnia and Somalia

Peace Operations: Theories explaining PSO



Political

(1) **PSO and PKO** is war from the low intensity PKO up to Peace Enforcement (PE)


(2) PSO troops intervene with a political aim, and (the threat of) violence is the means for influencing the parties

(3) PSO always benefits one of the parties, it is **never neutral**, it is never “impartial”, one parts interest is not served.

(4) PKO is different from war because Third Party is **disinterested**. His political motives are weak, his military motivation is low, his popular support at home is transient.

(5) One may intervene even if above is the case. Within what own population and politicians think is a reasonable cost (in money and human life) the PSO will gain influence in AoR.

Peace Operations: Clausewitz' model of war



Interaction between parties



- No logical limit to the use of force
- As long as Enemy can hope to win he will not do as we want
- Both sides judge what is needed to overcome EN

Extremes

- Maximum use of force
- The aim is to disarm Enemy
- Maximum effort



Peace Operations: Clausewitz' model of war



Modifications in practise

- a. War is not an isolated act, other priorities
- b. War does not consist of a single short blow
- c. In War the result is never final
- d. The lesser war object, the lesser effort
- e. Political object of war not always the military
- f. Less hate, less determination
- g. Standstill caused by fear and misjudgement
- h. Both parties may be too weak to attack

Peace Operations: Clausewitz' used on PSO

The three permanent moderators can be reinforced by PSO presence:

- a. Knowledge of EN lack of intention lowers own determination**
Tell them that the opposite party wants peace, and is not as bad as ...etc. Force upon one or both parties other priorities (embargoes, etc.) Apply Confidence Building Measures.
- b. War is always divided in time and space.**
Divide it even more preventing parties doing their utmost: safe zones, demarcation lines, cease-fires, occupied zones, check-points, etc.
- c. The war-outcome is not final**
Deter the parties part: If you destroy other part we will intervene on losers side, and skew a later peace-deal.

Peace Operations: Clausewitz' used on PSO

The five possible moderators can be activated or reinforced by PSO presence:

d. **The smaller the aim, the lesser action**

State that destruction of a party will lead to full-scale intervention, then a limited war is the result.

e. **Block some war-aims to distance the war from its central aims**

PSO will not tolerate extermination of civilians, impose/remove embargoes

f. **Less hate, less war**

Apply PSYOPS and CIMIC, exchange casualties, repair damage, support justice

g. **Fear and misperceptions reduces action**

Induce fear and misperception to the parties, at least about yourself

h. **Both parties can be too weak to attack**

Peace Operations: The Practise of PSO 1

16th – 19th Century	Just War tradition	A tradition of allowing disinterested third-parties to intervene in case of “crimes are being committed that “shock the moral conscience of mankind” (mostly Christians during the decline of the Ottoman Empire; Crete, Lebanon)
Early 20th Century	Pre-UN trials	The League of Nations (predecessor to UN) developed some instruments. (Military observers at Gibraltar, French protection of Memel 1920-23).
1946-1988	Classical UN PKO	Classical Super-power authorised peacekeeping (but Korea 1950-53)
1988-1992	“New World Order”	Mellowing and destruction of Soviet Empire leaves free room for many new UN PKO, many of which reasonably successful: Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Albania.
1992-1995	Misery	Applying PKO-methods to really tough conflicts fails in Somalia and Bosnia leading to losses, confusion, withdrawal and humiliation of sending states, Rwanda '95 being the breaking point.
1995 till present	A new beginning?	US salvages Western credibility. Doctrinal confusion addressed. Retrenchment, then re-assessment. Kosovo and East Timor actions of necessity.

Peace Operations: The Practise of PSO 2

A Brief History of PKO Doctrine 1946-99

Doctrine is here understood in the loose sense as “the dominant line of thought guiding the actions of the intervening force”.

Doctrine is made and formulated on four levels:

National Political

National political documents, speeches, decisions

International political

UNSC resolutions, SG papers, DPKO instructions

Military doctrine

National doctrine (+ NATO and Work Groups)

Operation specific

UN High Representative, Mission Commander, contributing nations , SOFA, ROE

Peace Operations: The Practise of PSO 3

2.1 1946-88 Classical PKO: East West Conflict Prevention

National Political	Little attention given, except from nine PKO supporters whose foreign policy stressed PKO: AU, CA, AUS, NZ, DK, SW, NO, FI. (Later Fiji, Nepal and others joins up for the money)
International political	PKO seen as convenient instrument by UNSC, otherwise indifference. UN Charter “Chapter 6½” (Hammersjold, 58). Applied after war: Peace – Crisis – War – De-escalation – Peace 1) A Neutral military force 2) With no permanent member participation 3) Under command of UN (DPKO → SC) 4) Accepted by hosting <u>states</u> 5) Tasked to support a (peace-)agreement 6) Using violence in self-defence. From 1973 mandate too UN taken over by NAM in alliance with USSR, UN attempts to systematise operations unsuccessful.
Military doctrine	No doctrinal attention from professional militaries, possibly except CA. Becomes a “holdiday” industry at places.
Operation specific	Ad-hoc guidance by SG and USGDPKO (Goulding, Annan). Avoid any decisive action.

Peace Operations: The Practise of PSO 4

2.2 1988-92 “New World Order”: PKO All-round Instrument

National Political	Much excitement and expectation. Dozens of new PKO-supporting countries and missions. Glossy picture of “Blue Helmets” idolised.
International political	PKO seen as Big Problem Solver. Nobel Peace Prize to PKO (prize money stolen inside UN) DPKO and FOD over-stretch: Limited ad-hoc guidance. Some significant successes in spite of UN corruption and disarray
Military doctrine	“Nordic Peacekeeping” doctrine printed 1992: “UN Soldiers have no enemies, just parties”, “Peacekeeping is not a soldiers job, but only soldiers can do it”. US studies, and UK copies “Nordic” approach.
Operation specific	Ad-hoc guidance by SG and USGDPKO (Goulding) trying to cope.

Peace Operations: The Practise of PSO 5

1992-95 Misery: PKO Humiliation and defeat

National Political	Idealist doctrine if any. Sketchy understanding of conditions of PKO, control handed over to UN and UN instruments. As things starts going wrong no understanding of war. Post-war generation in charge, deaf and blind to war. The “Great Negotiators” brings disaster in the Balkans
International political	UN and SG blamed, Boutros-Boutros Ghali sacked by US. As humiliation becomes imminent and Europe is paralysed US takes command and cleans up with British and French assistance. UN irrelevant for a time, start reforms.
Military doctrine	Bitter criticism of UN and “Chp. 6½”, fundamentals sought. UK: “Wider PK” and US FM 100-23 states: PKO and PE mutually exclusive. No mission creep, and mandate creep tolerated (and no results created)
Operation specific	Much confusion: 4 generals leaves Balkans publicly protesting UN incredibility. Soldiers coping in spite of bad conditions, by cowardice or heroism or by just coping.

Peace Operations: The Practise of PSO 5

1995- now

New beginning: Repair and re-assessment


National Political	Repair on Balkans, withdrawal elsewhere. Then by 1999 follow-on to Balkans, the last Milosevic War (first NATO war), and East Timor. New instruments “Induced (forced) consent” and “Humanitarian Interventions” under development
International political	UN restructuring, but military affairs solidly in hands of contractors such as NATO
Military doctrine	Being revised away from non-productive “Wider PK”/FM 100-23 towards interventionist doctrines
Operation specific	Some bitter toughness. Some lessons learnt implemented.

Peace Operations: The Practise of PSO 6

2.5 UK Doctrine JWP 3-50 (1998)

- Practical in outlook, and sound in recommendations the doctrine is openly set to “avoid another UNPROFOR”.
- A clear statement of the necessity to work with NGOs for “conflict resolution”, and the need for carrot—stick approach to “consent building”.
- The need for close (“vertical”) political—military co-ordination permeates the doctrine.

The doctrine revolves around the need for consent, the withdrawal of consent, and the possibilities for inducing consent. Unfortunately, the obvious question is not asked “What determines the consent of the parties”.



Peace Operations: Summary

* Theories of war

Positive effects

Negative effects

Political (Clausewitzian)

* Clausewitz “Paradoxical Trinity”

Analytical tool

* Political theory of PKO

PKO is war, Intervenor is disinterested, limited willingness to sacrifice. Consent is enforced by mil. Means. Many “handles” to use for intervenor, mil-pol. co-ordination prime importance

* PKO history

Long and honourable tradition

Militaries failed early 90s, not assisting politicians

Retrenchment, re-assessment ongoing

Questions
Please?

