

The Influence of Clausewitz on Jomini's *Précis de l'Art de la Guerre*

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Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz's concept of absolute war is the result of his effort to contrast the phenomenon of war in which pure logic, or, as Clausewitz calls it, reason alone, reigns with war's articulation in reality. In its pure form, science facilitates the discovery of new relationships and the prediction of events without human intervention. However, recognising that war is a social endeavour, and, therefore, human intervention is inevitable, Clausewitz limits the use of absolute war to its theoretical framework in order to discover those elements of war which do not change over time and from one culture to another, thus constituting the nature of war. Consequently, the concept of trinity, war's tendency to escalation, and friction unfold, all of which represent the theoretical framework to explain what factors drive war's transformation in reality.

Antoine Henri Jomini does consider these questions as stimulating but also as rather philosophical:¹

One cannot deny that General Clausewitz has great knowledge, and a facile pen; but this pen, at times a little out of control, is above all too pretentious for a didactic discussion, the simplicity and clearness of which ought to be its first merit. Furthermore, the author displays far too much scepticism towards military science; his first volume is but a declamation against all theory of war, whilst the following two volumes, full of theoretic maxims, prove, however, that the author does believe in the efficacy of his own doctrines but not in that of others.

As for myself, I admit that I have been able to find but a small number of luminous ideas and remarkable articles in this scholarly labyrinth; and far from having shared the scepticism of the author, no work would have contributed more than his to convince me of the necessity and utility of good

¹ Jomini (1838) Vol. I, pp. 28; <http://www.pattonhq.com/militaryworks/jomini.html> accessed 1 June 2003: '...the metaphysical and sceptical works of some writers will not succeed in making one believe that there exists no rule

theories, if I had ever been able to doubt them: it is important simply to agree on the limits which ought to be assigned to them in order not to fall into a pedantry worse than ignorance; above all, it is necessary to distinguish the difference between a theory of principles and a theory of systems.

It will be objected perhaps that, in the greater part of the articles of this *Précis*, I myself acknowledge that there are few absolute rules to give on the diverse subjects of which they treat; I agree in good faith to this truth, but is that saying there is no theory? If, out of forty-five articles, some have ten positive maxims, others one or two only, are not 150 or 200 rules sufficient to form a respectable body of strategic or tactical doctrines? And if to those you add the multitude of precepts which suffer more or less exceptions, will you not have more dogmas than necessary for fixing your opinions upon all the operations of war?²

Jomini sees merit in some of Clausewitz's theoretical concepts. Which they are, though, is guesswork. One can, probably, limit it, with some degree of certainty, to the first book for its clearness and crispness of formulation. Jomini despises, however, the polemic against theory and – according to him – apparent contradictions in some parts of Clausewitz's mostly unedited text.³ Clausewitz does not, in Jomini's eyes, disclose discoveries in those areas in which Jomini's main interests lie: how does the international system work? How can one wage war, with all its different purposes, not only successfully but also legitimately, efficiently, and humanely? What makes the civil-military relationship work? How does one create an operational plan taking all foreign and domestic restraints into consideration? What should the command and control of military operations look like? How can all this be taught to someone else?

After writing for over 30 years, first critical military history and later political history, and after the experience of a dozen military campaigns at operational level, with *Précis*, Jomini's aim has been to write a textbook for military instruction.⁴ Clausewitz, however, has never

for war, for their writings prove absolutely nothing against maxims supported with the most brilliant modern feats of arms, and justified by the reasoning even of those who believe they are combating these rules.'

² Jomini (1838) Vol. I, pp. 21-22; <http://www.pattonhq.com/militaryworks/jomini.html> accessed 1 June 2003

³ This indicates by no means a cursory reading of 'On War', but proves that even the leading military scientist at the time could misinterpret Clausewitz's unedited text.

⁴ Rapin (2002), p. 13; Jomini (1838) Vol. I, pp. 26, 28; <http://www.pattonhq.com/militaryworks/jomini.html> accessed 1 June 2003.

For the purpose of clear understanding, I define strategic, operational and tactical levels of armed conflict as follows:

intended to do so with 'On War'. 'On War' is the result of Clausewitz's personal reflection on war in theory in order to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon for himself.⁵ H. Rothfels puts it like this: Clausewitz has been 'imbued with the spirit of search for the "absolute", for the very nature or the "regulative idea" of things, a spirit which then dominated German philosophy.'⁶ Although Jomini's writings reflect the same insights as Clausewitz's, different questions have driven their scientific endeavour which, not surprisingly, have resulted in different answers. This may be the reason why Jomini has not ventured in such areas as the nature of war, where he might attribute merit to Clausewitz, but shifted his focus even more to those topics he had always been drawn to: to the applied science of politics and warfare, and the question how this can be taught.⁷

Investigating the influence of Clausewitz on Jomini's *Précis de l'Art de la Guerre*, I will focus this study on the relationship of politics and war. However, in a first part, I will put Jomini's intellectual development in its context, and examine the main factors which might have influenced Jomini's writing before his reading of 'On War'. Bearing in mind Jomini's *Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon*, I will compare, in a second part, Jomini's *Tableau analytique* with his *Précis* in order to discern the changes made after reading 'On War'. I will combine the main points of the first and second part in a synthesis in order to deduce possible influences of 'On War' on *Précis*. I will conclude this study by putting the results in context with some of the most common criticism raised by other authors when comparing Jomini's very down-to-earth and utilitarian approach with Clausewitz's rather gnostic

The strategic level in a clash of interest includes policy and strategy. Policy sets the aims that are to be attained. Strategy, however, defines the ways how to impose one's own will upon the opponent. For that end, strategy uses a combination of different means of power such as diplomacy, economy, culture, ideology, information technology and armed forces as it sees fit.

The operational level translates allotted strategic aims into practise. The operational planning portions its assigned aims into military objectives. In doing so, the operational planning tunes all objectives with the military means at its disposal. At the same time it makes sure that these objectives are reached in a way that harmonizes with the given strategic aim. Consequently, the operational level functions as a hinge between the strategic and tactical level.

The tactical level attains objectives through actual employment of armed forces. The ensuing effects may be called tactical, operational, or even strategic depending on the resulting support or attainment of the strategic aim.

⁵ Clausewitz (1992), p. 104; Clausewitz (1989), p. 154: Clausewitz rejects any prescribed theories, principles or systems. These are just means to discover one's own theory through deliberate and objective analysis. Once its meaning is absorbed into his own way of thinking, it becomes one's second nature. In this way, every commander finds and improves his own, particular theory that helps the study of the conduct of war, and educates mind and judgement; Langendorf (2001), p. 98: Clausewitz assesses colonel Toll as a well instructed officer who, however, is far from having shed light on the nature of the conduct of war through deliberate reflection.

⁶ Earle (1942), pp. 94-95

reflections. I will argue that Jomini and Clausewitz ought to be seen as complementary and not, as it has been done often, mutually exclusive; Jomini's *Précis* represents the first modern and comprehensive military doctrine integrating strategic and operational levels of armed conflict whereas Clausewitz's 'On War' represents a unique work, in some parts, even of philosophical depth. The latter is timeless in the sense that 'On War' will always stimulate minds, while the former is of historical interest due to its immediate impact at the time of publication, and to its lasting influence on the creation of military doctrine.⁸

Jomini's background, and the context in which he was writing

Jomini was born on the 6th of March 1779 at Payerne, Switzerland. Both, the bidding of his father, a politician on the regional and later national level, and recent developments of the French revolution – the massacre of the Swiss Guards in 1792 in Paris – dissuaded Jomini from his initial wish to embark on a military career.⁹ He decided, instead, to become a trader.¹⁰ However, he never lost interest in military affairs, devouring every French or German publication on the subject.¹¹ After finishing his training in banking and finance in Aarau and Basel, and after two years of working experience in a Parisian bank, Jomini decided to try his luck as trader at the Parisian stock exchange in 1798.¹² During this time, Jomini had been intoxicated by the revolutionary spirit and mesmerized by Napoleon's military feats.¹³ In Switzerland, French troops liberated subjugated regions from aristocratic regimes imposing a republican constitution and a central government upon the Swiss Confederation.¹⁴ Jomini joined the war ministry of the newly established Helvetic Republic in 1799. There, aged twenty, he worked to create, organise, and administer a new army for the

⁷ Charles (1818), pp. viii-xii: In his foreword, Jomini attributes merit to Archduke Charles as being the first who has written a work suitable for instruction in the art of warfare. Jomini admits, furthermore, that his *Traité des grandes opérations* suffers from not having a similar theoretical introduction.

⁸ Rapin (2002), p. 236; Earle (1942), pp. 89-90: 'His *Précis* probably did more than any simple book to fix the great subdivisions of modern military science for good and all and give them common currency. ...he does do an admirable piece of elementary pedagogy which helps explain the great success of this manual in nineteenth century military education.', p. 92: 'Jomini's great service to military thought lay...in his clarification of the basic concepts of military science and in his definition of the sphere of strategy in warfare. In his emphasis upon the planning of operations, he made clear to his contemporaries the role which intelligence must play in war, and the establishment of general staff and military academies throughout Europe showed that, in this respect at least, his influence would continue to be felt.'

⁹ Rapin (2002), pp. 11-12; Langendorf (2001), pp. 2-4

¹⁰ Langendorf (2001), p. 4

¹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 5-6, 12, 16, 354-355

¹² *ibid.*, pp. 5-6

¹³ *ibid.*, pp. 6-9

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 357

defence of civil war torn Switzerland.¹⁵ In 1800, Jomini started to publish his first articles and commentaries titled '*Peut-on espérer la paix?*' and '*Des formes d'un bon gouvernement*' in the Helvetic Bulletin.¹⁶ Gambling debts and an administrative investigation against Jomini in 1801 made his situation uncomfortable.¹⁷ He decided to quit his job, and to go to Paris in order to embark, finally, on a military career. However, before he found a suitable place in the French army, he worked for Delpont, a company in the defence sector.¹⁸ However, he was soon made redundant by his employer, and a friend lent him 3,000 francs for speculation in 1801.¹⁹ This was the time when Jomini started his research into military history and the art of war. Jomini says that he himself had the feeling for principles, and that he had to convince those who were denying their existence.²⁰ Marchal Ney, having read Jomini's manuscript in December 1804, financed its publication, and promised Jomini an appointment to his staff as an aid-de-champs.²¹ Jomini, finally setting off his military career, joined Ney's general staff on the 3rd of march 1805.²²

The environment of the revolution, decomposition and, at the same time, hope for a new, more just world, had an important impact on Jomini's intellectual development. In an epoch of political instability, and changing values, Jomini craved for political and military certainty.²³ He tried to make sense out of the political mayhem in analysing political and military events. Besides this, the only way gaining a foothold in the military profession was through his military writing. Determined to become a professional officer, he indulged for his military self-education in such questions as which factors determine defeat or victory in war, how does politics influence the conduct of war, how does the international system work and influence politics, and how should civil-military relations and command and control look like?²⁴ In short, Jomini, presupposing the strategic level, focused his studies on the operational level of warfare.²⁵

Contrary to Clausewitz, Jomini never enjoyed any formal military education, and was entirely self-taught in military affairs.²⁶ However, through his formation in trade, banking and

¹⁵ Langendorf (2001), pp. 9-11

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 13

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 14

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 14

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 15

²⁰ Charles (1818), pp. vii-viii; Langendorf (2001), pp. 20-21

²¹ Langendorf (2001), p. 20

²² *ibid.*, p. 21

²³ *ibid.*, p. 358

²⁴ Rapin (2002), p. 127

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 236

²⁶ Langendorf (2001), p. 332

finance, and through his working experience in governmental administration and the defence industry, Jomini had a top-down educational experience that Clausewitz could not benefit from. These experiences, all these jobs demanding a pragmatic approach, and an contextual understanding of interrelated matters, left a lasting mark on Jomini's mindset which is mirrored throughout in his writings. Jomini's no-nonsense approach, his at times insulting frankness, and his lack of formal military education made him not easy to work with. He was often treated as an outsider by other military professionals, which Jomini, risen to instant stardom through the success of his first *opus* *Traité de grande tactique* (1805-1806), interpreted as jealousy.²⁷

Criticisms of Jomini's work

To appreciate the possible influence of 'On War' on Jomini's *Précis*, one has to retrace the criticism usually put forward regarding Jomini's dogmatic work at the time. Jomini composed his first proper theoretical work in Posen in 1806.²⁸ This exposé entitled *Résumé des principes généraux de l'art de la guerre* was published in Prussia, and extracts were translated into German and published in *Pallas*, a Prussian military journal, in the following year.²⁹ Later, an extended version was incorporated as the concluding chapter in Jomini's *Traité*.³⁰ Its preliminary remarks include a reaffirmation that 'these principles are independent either of arms, time, or place; they are unchanging; their application, however, require those variations which genius and experience indicate.'³¹ In the search of the causes of military victory, Jomini discloses his fundamental principle the application of which results in good military combinations whereas its disregard will have dire consequences; this principle 'consists to operate, with the greatest mass of one's forces, a combined effort at the decisive point.'³² Jomini stresses that not absolute superiority in numbers is essential, but the comparative superiority engaged on the day of battle. This superiority is achieved by superior manoeuvring prior to the battle.³³ Jomini deduces from it several maxims which – if properly applied – enhance the probability of success.³⁴ Jomini, drawing a line between "scientific"

²⁷ Rapin (2002), p. 26; Langendorf (2001), p. 359

²⁸ Jomini (1998), pp. 391-411

²⁹ Langendorf (2001), p. 44

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 37, 44

³¹ Jomini (1998), p. 391

³² *ibid.*, p. 394

³³ *ibid.*, pp. 394-395

³⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 394-406

war systems such as developed by Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow and his theory of principles, states that

Without any doubt, not one war system is exclusively good because each system is the result of hypothetical calculations; it is an action of human reasoning that may be mistaken, and often, with great eloquence and technical wording artfully arranged, is given the appearance of truth to utterly wrong-headed ideas. It is, however, a complete different matter with principles; they are unchangeable, human reasoning can neither modify nor destroy them.

...all military combinations relate to [these principles].³⁵

At first, Jomini's discoveries were widely applauded. Later, however, some critics found them simplistic, and far from revolutionary. Clausewitz is very Jominian in his early writings. He declares in book three of 'On War', writing on strategy in general, that 'there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated. We hold fast to this principle, and regard it as a reliable guide.'³⁶ Furthermore, '...all forces intended and available for a strategic purpose should be applied simultaneously; their employment will be the more effective the more everything can be concentrated on a single action at a single moment.'³⁷ In the book on defence, Clausewitz subscribes to the utility of Jomini's concept of operations on the interior line:

...troops are closer together and operating on interior lines. There is no need to demonstrate how this can multiply strength to the point where the attacker dare not expose himself to it unless he is greatly superior.

Once the defence has embraced the principle of movement...the benefit of greater concentration and interior lines becomes a decisive one which is more likely as a rule to lead to victory than a convergent pattern of attack.

...

³⁵ Jomini (1998), pp. 392-393

³⁶ Clausewitz (1989), p. 204

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 209

The foregoing remarks apply to tactics and to strategy alike. A particularly important point, concerning strategy only, remains to be made. The advantage of interior lines increases with the distances to which they relate.³⁸

However, these principles have in Clausewitz's eyes limited use; they are aids to analysis. According to Clausewitz, 'the man of action' may use principles in order to 'simplify understanding to its dominant features, which will serve as rules, and sometimes he must support himself with the crutch of established routine.'³⁹ However, 'the man of action must at times trust in the sensitive instinct of judgment, derived from his native intelligence and developed through reflection, which almost unconsciously hits on the right course.'⁴⁰ Clausewitz chimes in with Jomini's criticism of "scientific" constructs of war systems, saying

...recent theorist, who believed that in this way [geometry, or form and pattern in the deployment of forces in war] they would increase the importance of strategy. Strategy, they thought, expressed the higher functions of the intellect; they thought that war would be ennobled by its study, and, according to a modern substitution of concepts, be made more scientific. We believe that it is one of the chief functions of a comprehensive theory of war to expose such vagaries, and it is because the geometrical element usually provides the point of departure for these fantasies that we have drawn special attention to it.⁴¹

There is a twist, though, to Clausewitz's assertion. Jomini must have felt attacked by this assertion because, even though he does not adopt von Bülow's geometrical constructs as such – that is, he does not agree with von Bülow's dogmatic conclusions – he does, however, assimilate some of von Bülow's terminology, and also the idea of supremacy of the operational over the tactical level. Clausewitz's criticism of the Jominian approach is apparent when he says that

efforts were...made to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules, or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people failed to take

³⁸ Clausewitz (1989), pp. 368-369

³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 213

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 213

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 215; see as well p. 135

adequate account of the endless complexities involved. ...the conduct of war branches out in almost all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a synthesis. An irreconcilable conflict exists between this type of theory and actual practice.⁴²

Clausewitz reproaches these theorists for not having considered both, that war is an interaction of two opposing wills, and that, next to physical, psychological matters are inextricably intertwined with military action.⁴³ A final stab into Jomini's concept, however, must have been Clausewitz's explicit criticism of the interior lines later on:

'...another geometrical principle was then exalted: that of so-called interior lines. Even though this tenet rests on solid ground – on the fact that the engagement is the only effective means in war – its purely geometrical character, still makes it another lopsided principle that could never govern a real situation.⁴⁴

Jomini's reaction to these criticisms can be seen in his lengthy introduction to the *Précis*.⁴⁵ In it, he reasserts his theoretical approach, and sketches out the present theory of war and its utility. For Jomini, however, Clausewitz's criticisms is not new. Prior to 'On War', he has often been confronted to the same allegations by different Prussian pamphleteers.⁴⁶ In the past, Jomini has spent much effort to fend off such critics as Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst and Rühle von Lilienstern, and yet, the same criticisms are to be found in 'On War'. It must have been very frustrating for Jomini. These relentless criticisms by Prussian officers must have been especially hurtful; Jomini was, in his heart, very fond of Prussia, and a keen admirer of Prussia's military legacy. Jomini was very proud of the benevolent reception of his *Traité* in Prussia; he even dedicated initially his *Traité* to the King of Prussia.⁴⁷ Furthermore, in 1806, he drafted a memorandum against the restoration of Poland at the expense of Prussia.⁴⁸

⁴² Clausewitz (1989), p. 134

⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 134, p. 136

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 135-136

⁴⁵ Jomini (1838), pp. 11-33; <http://www.pattonhq.com/militaryworks/jomini.html> accessed 1 June 2003

⁴⁶ Langendorf (2001), p. 46, 48, pp. 71-72; Colson (2001), pp. 23-24; Rapin (2002), pp. 106-111

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 29-30

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 35-36

In short, the criticism of Jomini usually put forward is limited in the sense that it draws attention only to Jomini's dogmatic work; it is ambivalent, though, in the sense that Clausewitz sees merit in the Jominian principles as an analytical tool, and even adopts sometimes some of them himself in 'On War'.

Analysis of Jomini's adaptations in *Précis de l'art de la guerre*

Comparing the content of *Tableau* with that of *Précis*, one can generally state that both maintain the same hierarchic idea: the supremacy of the strategic level over the operational and tactical levels. After preliminary definitions of basic terminology, a chapter on war politics follows. There, the relationship of war as a means for attaining political ends, the necessary overall effort, and the influence of war's purpose on operations – the manner of execution and their scales in size and space – is established.⁴⁹ There is one significant change in the dissection of the art of war from *Tableau* to *Précis*; in *Tableau*, Jomini defines strategy as the art of moving the masses in the theatre of war, whereas in *Précis*, he makes the distinction between strategy, as the art of directing properly the masses in the theatre of war, and logistics, as the practical application of the art of moving armies.⁵⁰ In *Précis'* chapter one, Jomini adds one article on wars of opinions in which he discusses wars that are principally fought over divergent ideologies.⁵¹

Chapter two in *Tableau* is written without subdividing articles. In *Précis*, Jomini gives structure to this chapter and extends its content. Article 13 is on military institutions, where three more essential conditions for the perfection of the armed forces are added:

...

10. A good supply system, hospitals, and the administration in general;
11. A good system of command and control, and high command;
12. The stimulation of the military spirit.⁵²

⁴⁹ Jomini (1830), p. 5: '...un homme d'Etat doit juger lorsqu'une guerre est convenable, opportune, ou même indispensable, et déterminer les diverses opérations qu'elle nécessitera pour atteindre son but.'; Jomini (1838), p. 39: 'On juge que ces différentes espèces de guerre influent un peu sur la nature des opérations qu'elles exigeront pour arriver au but proposé, sur la grandeur des effort qu'il faudra à cet effet, et sur l'étendue des entreprises qu'on sera à même de former.'

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 1-4; Jomini (2001), pp. 45-46

⁵¹ Jomini (1838), pp. 63-71

⁵² Jomini (2001), p. 94

Furthermore, several paragraphs concerning civil-military relations are added. They discuss forms of governments and political systems, systems for calling up reserves and demobilisation, training in time of peace, and systems of promotion.⁵³ Additionally, Jomini muses over the trade-offs between personal freedom and security, and the danger, inherent in any democratic state, to degenerate into a dictatorship in a situation of extreme emergency:

...the small number of instances in history makes rather a list of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them.⁵⁴

Jomini concedes that technological change and the ever growing firepower on the battlefield herald 'a great revolution in army organisation, armament, and tactics'⁵⁵, and the state that promotes technological developments will have the edge over potential adversaries.⁵⁶ Jomini proves to be almost clairvoyant predicting armoured cavalry and infantry if governments do not pull together and proscribe through international regulation these new highly lethal means of warfare.⁵⁷ However, he reaffirms that strategy with its principles will not change because they are independent of the nature of weaponry and the organisation of the troops.⁵⁸ Finally, in summarising the basic needs for a wise military policy, Jomini adds in *Précis* the point that if the head of government does not lead his armies in person, it should be his highest priority to select the most able general, educated in both politics and military matters, to take charge in his stead leading the armies in campaigns.⁵⁹

Jomini adds article 14 on command and control, and supreme command, and article 15 which discusses civil-military relations and the kindling of military spirit in a nation.⁶⁰ Article 14 is remarkable because the influence of 'On War' is undeniably obvious. Jomini's

⁵³ Jomini (2001), pp. 95-99

⁵⁴ Jomini (1992), p. 46

⁵⁵ Jomini (2001), pp. 98-99

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 98

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 99

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 98

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p. 99

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 103-119

discussion of the necessary qualities of the commander-in-chief reflects Clausewitz's chapter on military genius. Clausewitz describes two kinds of courage; 'courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility....'⁶¹ Furthermore, Clausewitz differentiates two kinds of courage in face of personal danger; indifference to danger as such, and alternatively, courage resulting 'from such positive motives as ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind.'⁶² Jomini describes two essential qualities for a commander-in-chief; moral courage which leads to great determination, and *sang-froid* – physical courage in face of danger.⁶³ Jomini deviates, however, from Clausewitz by stating that social competence is far more important than intellectual capacity for the commander-in-chief who will be assisted by his chief-of-staff. According to Jomini, 'it is not necessary that he [the commander-in-chief] should be a man of vast erudition.'⁶⁴ He does need to know few things well though; he has to have well absorbed the regulating principles.⁶⁵ In the matter of the use of theory and principles, Clausewitz's position differs not that much from Jomini's. Clausewitz acknowledges theory and principles as tools for critical analysis in order to educate one's own judgment. He states that

Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield.⁶⁶

Clausewitz admits that 'no activity for the human mind is possible without a certain stock of ideas; for the most part these are not innate but acquired, and constitute a man's knowledge.'⁶⁷ However, Clausewitz rejects any prescribed theories, principles or systems. A commander has to discover his own theory through deliberate and objective analysis.⁶⁸ Once its meaning is absorbed into his own way of thinking, it becomes one's second nature. In this

⁶¹ Clausewitz (1989), p. 101

⁶² *ibid.*, p. 101

⁶³ Jomini (2001), p. 107

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 107

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p. 107

⁶⁶ Clausewitz (1989), p. 141

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p. 145

⁶⁸ Clausewitz (1992), p. 104

way, every commander finds and improves his own, particular theory that 'helps the study of the conduct of war, and educates the mind and judgment....'⁶⁹

Jomini esteems the commander-in-chief's social competence as being more important than his intellectual capacity. He must be a man of braveness, justice, firmness, and equitableness capable of esteeming merit in others instead of being jealous of it, making the merit of others conducive to his own glory.⁷⁰ To compensate for his lack of technical knowledge, the commander-in-chief has to be paired up with an able chief-of-staff.⁷¹ In this context, discussing the organisation of supreme command, Jomini takes up the notion of trinity.⁷² The head of government should be surrounded by two of the most able generals; one of them a man of known executive ability, the other a well instructed staff officer.⁷³ The supreme command is formed by this triumvirate. Jomini uses the notion of trinity differently from Clausewitz. Clausewitz says that

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon, its dominant tendencies always make war a wondrous trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force [*blinder Naturtrieb*]⁷⁴; of the play of chance and probabilities within the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends of the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

.... These three tendencies are ... deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would

⁶⁹ Clausewitz (1989), p. 154

⁷⁰ Jomini (2001), p. 107

⁷¹ *ibid.*, pp. 108-110

⁷² *ibid.*, p. 104

⁷³ *ibid.*, p. 104

⁷⁴ Clausewitz (1952), p. 111

conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.⁷⁵

Jomini's use of the same terminology suggests that he sees value in that concept. This implies that Jomini sees the supreme command as 'a true chameleon that adapts its characteristics to the given case'⁷⁶, and that their relationship to one another will be variable; one's talent will compensate for the other's technical shortcomings; one's passionate outburst will be checked by the other's rational calculations and reasoning; one's military instinct for escalation will be checked by the other's political argumentation to see military operations in their context; and finally, one will have the talent to inspire support, the other the technical skill to put the military machine into gear, and the last embodies the legitimacy of the military action. Jomini clearly puts emphasis on the selection of the members in the supreme command. He highlights, additionally, the importance of a good general staff.⁷⁷ Jomini's treatment of the degree of political interference – or better, the interaction of the strategic with the operational level – in the planning and execution of campaigns is exemplary in order to show the difference between the Jominian pragmatic approach and Clausewitz's theoretical discussion. Clausewitz states that

War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operation detail.⁷⁸

Jomini translates this by saying that a general plan of operation should not trace out the campaign in detail, restricting the generals at their peril, but it should determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether offensive or defensive, the material

⁷⁵ Clausewitz (1989), p. 89

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p. 89

⁷⁷ Jomini (2001), p. 108

⁷⁸ Clausewitz (1989), p. 579

means to be applied to these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the levies which may be necessary if the country were invaded.⁷⁹ These points ought to be discussed in a governmental council consisting of both generals and ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be limited.⁸⁰ Clausewitz's discussion goes clearly beyond what Jomini's paragraph expresses. However, it is Jomini, again, who gives a viable solution to the complex problem of supreme command and strategic control. Be it as it may, Jomini's understanding of how politics permeates operations does not really differ from Clausewitz's. Recalling Jomini's insistence of the commander-in-chief's political education, and the idea of sharing the supreme command in between a triumvirate consisting the head of state, the commander-in-chief, and the chief-of-staff, one sees that, in Jomini's eyes, the political and operational necessities must be mutually understood, not only by the strategic leadership, but also by the operational leadership. Jomini simply draws the line where interference degenerates into technical micromanagement by people who do not know the particular circumstances in the theatre of operations during an ongoing campaign.⁸¹

Article 15 discusses civil-military relations and the kindling of military spirit in a nation. This article exemplifies, again, the fundamental difference between – but also complementarity of – the Jominian and Clausewitzian approach. Clausewitz repeatedly underlines the importance of moral factors. However, he does never disclose how these factors might be enhanced in 'On War'. There, Jomini sets in discussing how moral superiority can be achieved and maintained, especially in peacetime, preparing a nation for a future armed conflict. Jomini points out several elements worth mentioning; the wellbeing of the state's economy, the importance of sound administration and wise institutions, the appreciation of achievements in the civil sector, easing the transition from military service into civil service, and finally, the preparation of the armed forces by hardening them.⁸²

The changes in chapter three 'on strategy' are more subtle but, nevertheless, important to the understanding of how Clausewitz influenced Jomini's *Précis*. Chapter three of *Précis* is based on chapter two of *Tableau*. However, the introduction of logistics as a new element in the art of war, and Jomini's clearer drawing of the demarcation lines between the separate elements of the art lead to a new organisation of its content. Jomini adds two new articles; article 16 'on offensive or defensive systems of operations', and article 28 'on strategic

⁷⁹ Jomini (2001), p. 111

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p. 111

⁸¹ *ibid.*, pp. 111-112

⁸² *ibid.*, pp. 113-119

operations in mountainous regions'. Additionally, he extends considerably his analytical tool which he calls 'chessboard'.⁸³

In *Tableau*, the introduction of the corresponding chapter is plain. It stresses the importance of civil-military cooperation in general during war; but it does not explicitly mention the cooperation or interaction of political and military leadership at the strategic level during planning. In his preliminary remarks to chapter three of *Précis*, Jomini does not only stress this interaction, but he adds the notion of the 'nature of war', saying,

Let us suppose the armed forces are about to embark upon a campaign: the first care of the commander-in-chief will be to agree with the head of government upon the nature of war; then he must carefully study the theatre of operations, and select, in concert with the head of state, the most suitable base of operation, taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies.⁸⁴

Jomini has deleted one paragraph in *Tableau*, editing the text on war politics, which says that 'A state is led to war by different motives which influence the nature of this war.'⁸⁵ Writing up the same chapter for *Précis*, Jomini concludes, after a list of different war purposes, that 'It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some degree the nature of operations which will be necessary to attain the proposed end, the magnitude of effort they demand, and even the scale of operations one will undertake.'⁸⁶ In the article on wars of intervention, Jomini points out the importance of the commander-in-chief's ability to reconcile all divergent interests of a coalition with one common objective. For this end, the commander-in-chief has to be politician and military at the same time. Editing this paragraph, Jomini changes 'In this kind of wars,...'⁸⁷ in *Tableau* into 'In wars of this nature,...'⁸⁸ in *Précis*.

The above shown changes made by Jomini indicate that he appreciates Clausewitz's notion of the nature of war with all its theoretical implications by assimilating it. This does not mean, in any way, that the insights encapsulated in Clausewitz theoretical concepts were new for Jomini as such. In structuring them more systematically and more coherently, it may, however, have made Jomini more conscious of them. Jomini's military history is a treasure

⁸³ Jomini (2001), p. 133

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 121-122

⁸⁵ Jomini (1830), p. 5

⁸⁶ Jomini (2001), pp. 47-48

⁸⁷ Jomini (1830), p. 20

⁸⁸ Jomini (2001), p. 60

box for this matter. In it, one finds many examples reflecting ideas which are usually associated with Clausewitz. The idea of trinity can be found where Jomini describes the effect of Prussia's defection on the people, the army, and the government. He says that 'it agitated the army and the people: the government needed...all confidence in order to resist the general drag.'⁸⁹ Another Clausewitzian concept is war's inherent tendency of escalating to extremes, in theory.⁹⁰ Again, this very idea can be found in Jomini's military history. He puts the crucial question any strategic leadership has to answer when embarking on a military campaign asking, '...will the King of Sardinia give in to a first fright, and will he sue for peace at the most harsh conditions, or will he persist in his alliance at the risk to be forced to seek refuge in the Austrian camp, and, consequently, to push war to extremes?'⁹¹ Additionally, Jomini discloses the security dilemma and its inherent tendency leading to extremes: '...a reciprocal fear, led to extremes, becomes often the cause for the most violent political wrangle, and pushes men over reasonable limits.'⁹² Furthermore, putting himself in Napoleon's shoes, Jomini perceives the relationship between stakes and effort; if the stakes are high, so will be the effort and the will to sustain the war as well as the readiness to escalate the means of violence. Jomini says, 'not once was France so close to her ruin, and yet showed so much energy.'⁹³ Jomini continues, 'Austria made her last efforts to mobilise formidable masses.'⁹⁴ Most comprehensively, Jomini concludes that

The continental system influenced the political system of Europe because it made England to pursue war as it obliged me to carry on with it. However, from this moment on, war took a more serious turn. For England, the public fortune – her survival that is – was at risk. The war became a public affair. The English trusted no longer foreigners with their protection; they took over themselves, and appeared with strong armed forces on the continent. As

⁸⁹ Jomini (1827) Vol. IV, p. 252

⁹⁰ Clausewitz (1989), pp. 75-77

⁹¹ Jomini (1998), p. 349: '...le roi de Sardaigne céderait-il à une première frayeur, et achèterait-il la paix aux conditions les plus dures, ou persisterait-il dans son alliance, au risque d'être forcé à chercher un refuge dans le camp autrichien, et de pousser ensuite la guerre à outrance?'

⁹² Jomini (1827) Vol. II, p. 79: '...une crainte réciproque, portée à l'excès, devient souvent la cause des démêlés politiques les plus violents et pousse les hommes au-delà des bornes raisonnables....'

⁹³ Jomini (1827) Vol. III, p. 51: 'À aucune époque dans sa révolution la France ne fut si près de sa perte, et ne montra tant d'énergie.'

⁹⁴ Jomini (1827) Vol. III, p. 140: 'l'Autriche fit ses derniers efforts pour mettre sur pied des masses formidables.'

allies, they took aboard everyone whose interests were momentarily hurt by my system; and the number was considerable.⁹⁵

However, Jomini believes strongly in the need to limit this tendency to extremes through international law. He remarks that without international regulation forbidding *levée en masse* the population of civilised nations will be reaped by war; the sort of war that will be more cursed than ever as being waged for the trifling reason of the maintenance of the balance of power.⁹⁶ Jomini grasps also the idea that war aims may change during campaigns: 'Already, the war has completely changed aims: ...the counter revolution was no more the motive of the coalition, as the rights of third states were not longer the motive of the republicans.'⁹⁷

In his concept of defence and its relation to attack, Clausewitz concludes that 'the attacker is to perish by the sword or by his own exertions' if he fails to go over to the defence at a certain point due to losses, overstretched logistics, and growing strength of the defending enemy.⁹⁸ Every campaign plan has to consider this 'culminating point'. Clausewitz continues, saying that 'the natural goal of all campaign plans, therefore, is the turning point at which attack becomes defence.'⁹⁹ Consequently, '...the stages of the offensive – that is, the intentions and the actions taken – as often turn into defensive action as defensive plans grow into the offensive.'¹⁰⁰ Jomini recognises this interrelatedness of defensive and offensive action. In *Tableau*, however, he limits it to the tactical level emphasizing the importance of initiative at the operational level whereas in *Précis*, Jomini extends the concept of defence-offence to the operational level. Discussing *la grande tactique* in *Tableau*, Jomini says the following about the defensive-offensive:

We have already shown, discussing strategic operations, which advantages stem from initiative; however, we have seen at the same time

⁹⁵ Jomini (1827) Vol. II, p. 445: 'Cette nécessité [le système continental] a influé le système politique de l'Europe, en ce qu'elle a fait à l'Angleterre une nécessité de poursuivre l'état de guerre, et m'a mis dans l'obligation d'y persévérer de mon côté. Dès ce moment aussi, elle a pris un caractère plus sérieux. Il s'agissait pour l'Angleterre de la fortune publique, c'est-à-dire de son existence. La guerre se popularisa. Les Anglais ne confièrent plus à des étrangers le soin de leur protection; ils s'en chargèrent eux-mêmes, et reparurent avec de fortes armées sur le continent. Ils devaient avoir pour auxiliaires tous ceux dont mon système froissait momentanément les intérêts; et le nombre en était considérable.'

⁹⁶ Jomini (1998), p. 410

⁹⁷ Jomini (1827) Vol. I, p. 38: 'Déjà la guerre a entièrement change de but: les droits de la noblesse, la contre-révolution, la prérogative royale, ne sont plus les motifs de la coalition, comme les droits des tiers-état ne sont plus les mobiles du parti républicain.'

⁹⁸ Clausewitz (1989), p. 384

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 570

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p. 526

that, in tactics, the one who awaits may turn all these advantages to his side knowing to pass from the defence to the offensive. However, a general who awaits the enemy like an automaton, without any other precautions taken than to combat vigorously, will always succumb if he is well attacked.

...

A general, therefore, can employ with the same success, for battles, both, the defensive or offensive system; however he must not limit himself to a passive defence, but he has to know when to pass from the defensive to the offensive at the appropriate moment.¹⁰¹

In *Précis*, Jomini discusses the interaction of the offensive and the defensive with more subtlety. Jomini admits that 'a defensive war has its advantages' when it is combined with counterattacks.¹⁰² This active defence can accomplish great successes.¹⁰³ However, Jomini still stresses the advantages of the initiative and the offensive, especially at the operational level.¹⁰⁴ He says,

The one who takes this initiative knows in advance what he is doing, and what he desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to strike. The one who awaits is everywhere anticipated; the enemy falls upon fractions of his armed forces; he neither knows where his adversary will direct his main effort nor with which means he should oppose it.¹⁰⁵

Jomini continues, saying,

The one who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then seek to bring the matter to a conclusion as promptly as possible: the defence, on the contrary, desires delay until his adversary is weakened by

¹⁰¹ Jomini (1830), pp. 163-164: 'Nous avons déjà indiqué, en parlant des opérations stratégiques, tous les avantages que procure l'initiative; mais nous avons reconnu en même temps, qu'en tactique, celui qui attendait pouvait faire tourner tous ces avantages de son côté, en sachant à propos passer de la défensive à l'offensive. Un général qui attendra l'ennemi comme un automate, sans autre parti pris que celui de combattre vaillamment, succombera toujours, lorsqu'il sera bien attaqué.... Un général peut donc employer avec le même succès, pour les batailles, le system offensif ou défensif; mais il est indispensable à cet effet, que, loin de se borner à une résistance passive, il sache passer de la défensive à l'offensive, quand le moment est venu;....'

¹⁰² Jomini (2001), pp. 130-131

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p. 131

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p. 130

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, p. 130

sending off detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to his progress.¹⁰⁶

Jomini asserts, seen strictly from a military standpoint of view, that 'an army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by flagrant inferiority.'¹⁰⁷ On the defensive, the armed forces seek to re-establish the equilibrium of chances, and has to attack relentlessly all weak points which will be opportunely presented by the enemy.¹⁰⁸

The influence of Clausewitz is, again, recognisable and probable, making Jomini focus his own thoughts, and express them more coherently. To apply the defensive-offensive system not only at the tactical level, as done in the *Tableau*, but also at the operational level, might be retraced to the lecture of 'On War'. However, the effect upon an invading army of both protracted defence and evasion of the decisive battle, Jomini clearly describes in his military history work on the Russian campaign and on the war of Spanish Peninsula.¹⁰⁹

Without explicitly referring to Clausewitz in the text itself, one may conclude that Jomini sees in 'On War's book one, chapter one some of these 'luminous ideas and remarkable articles' in Clausewitz's 'scholarly labyrinth.' However, Jomini's use of terminology is not as clear-cut as it could be. The reason for this may be found, again, in Jomini's mindset. Supplementing a paragraph about strategy for *Précis*, Jomini deplors 'all efforts made by meticulous writers who confuse the science in making it too abstract and exact.'¹¹⁰ For Jomini, science has one final purpose: the prediction and control of events. He says that 'science consists in providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny....'¹¹¹ Therefore, Jomini is very exact in terminology if it comes to defining all elements of his tool of operational analysis, the chessboard; he is less so, however, if it comes to a philosophical exploit such as Clausewitz's because he does not see much practical use in it, and, therefore, less need for clear terminology.

¹⁰⁶ Jomini (2001), p. 131

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*, p. 131

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p. 131

¹⁰⁹ Jomini (1827) Vol. IV, pp. 91-112; Jomini (1998), p. 313: footnote 1, pp. 399-400: footnote 1, pp. 406-407: footnote 2

¹¹⁰ Jomini (1838) Vol. II, p. 196

¹¹¹ Jomini (1992), p. 43

Conclusion

Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert point out that Jomini fails 'to consider the possibility that war may have a dynamic tendency which drives it beyond its original limits and original purposes.'¹¹² As shown above, this does not stand up to scrutiny. Jomini does not only disclose the security dilemma and its inherent tendency leading to extremes, but he also grasps the idea that war aims may change during campaigns. Jomini recognises indeed that war may escalate, or, that its underlying political aims might change during a conflict depending on the outcomes of campaigns. Jomini's mindset, however, discards the very idea that escalation is something that just happens by itself. Jomini does not think of war as something governed by itself, but as a human endeavour controlled by decision-makers. Jomini omits, therefore, the notion of war's inherent tendency to escalate to extremes, as Clausewitz describes it in his theoretical framework of absolute war, because escalating an armed conflict is, for Jomini as well as for Clausewitz, a decision intentionally made by those in control.

Michael Howard criticises Jomini for having gone too far in the process of abstracting:

Unfortunately Jomini's analytic *penchant* led him farther into the field of abstract reasoning than his practical experience of war should have permitted him to venture. It may be legitimate, but it is also dangerous, for a theorist to think of a theatre of war in terms of a "chessboard". ... Jomini embroidered a complex pattern of strategic lines, strategic points, objective points, strategic positions, strategic fronts, operational fronts, pivots of operations, pivots of manoeuvre, zones of operations and lines of communication, each defined with the precision of a medieval schoolman and fitted into a general synthesis in a manner calculated to baffle the simple and fascinate the worst sort of intellectual soldier.¹¹³

Howard's criticism is, however, hardly justified. The abstraction of the theatre of operation into lines and zones has to be understood in the context of the planning work in the general staff. These *schemata* help to discern and visualize different alternative courses of military action, that is, the general direction of advance or withdrawal, with their comparative advantages and disadvantages. It is the general staff officer's task to prepare viable

¹¹² Meade (1942), p. 90

¹¹³ Howard (1975), p. 16

alternative courses of action in such a way that they are ready to be decided upon by the commanding officer. Clear terminology is, for this purpose, crucial in order to avoid misunderstandings not only between the staff and the commanding officer but also to issue definitive orders to subordinated commanders. The 'chessboard', therefore, is a tool of analysis; a crutch so to speak, nothing more and nothing less. Everyone familiar with military staff work has used similar tools in a similar way; they may, however, simply be adapted to the state-of-the-art visualizing equipment:




Fig. 1: The figure depicts one possible course of action of an armoured infantry division.¹¹⁴

John Shy ascribes to the 'Jominian faith' a 'remarkable tenacity'.¹¹⁵ This faith is described, according to Shy, as the didactic, prescriptive, and reductionist approach of studying strategy, or war as a whole.¹¹⁶ For the sake of clarity, rigor, and utility,

...time, space, force levels and capabilities, plus some general description of national "interests" and "objectives" are taken to be the crucial variables

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¹¹⁵ Shy (1994), p. 185

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 181

for strategic analysis, with all other factors or possibilities relegated to the background, available of course for further consideration but essentially regarded as negligible in the business of using and controlling violence.¹¹⁷

This criticism is mainly based on Jomini's pedagogical work, and does not take the majority of his writing into account. Obviously, Shy disregards the fact that different questions and different purposes of a scientific enquiry will produce different answers. Science is concerned with observation and analysis, and with theorizing in order to explain and to predict. As in other areas of social science, in military science, it is difficult to distinguish the pure from the applied form as it is done in the physical sciences.¹¹⁸ Quincy Wright explains that

[In its pure form, science] organizes knowledge to facilitate the discovery of new relationships and the prediction of events without human intervention.

[In its applied form, science] organizes knowledge to facilitate the control of events by human intervention and may have the effect of creating vested interests opposed to discovery. There can be no human society without human intervention. Thus, to state social conditions which cause phenomena deemed undesirable is to direct attention to a program of reform.¹¹⁹

In other words in social science, prescription is inherent to prediction. Whether a suggested course of action is taken or not, is a question of policy in accordance with an adopted strategy.

Jomini is aware of the complexity of war; as well as of the impossibility of reducing the phenomenon to a simple scientific formula.¹²⁰ No simple answer, is sufficient; however, answers that are too complex will not be helpful either. Jomini looks in *Précis* at politics and war as a doctrinist. In doing so, he sheds some light on one particular aspect of war: the operational level. Clausewitz, however, is on a different search in 'On War': He is looking for the very nature or the regulative idea of war.¹²¹ Are not both, Jomini's and Clausewitz's approaches, two legitimate foci of academic enquiry? Both approaches isolate manageable parts of the single whole that 'war' represents. In doing so, and in interrelating them with

¹¹⁷ Shy (1994), p. 183

¹¹⁸ Wright (1965), p. 16

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 16

¹²⁰ Jomini (1994), p. 13, 377, 390

each other, one gains different insights about the possible causes and resulting effects in order to explain what the fundamental nature of war is; why, how and for what purpose war is fought; how peace can be brought about and finally, how war can be prevented.

Précis constitutes just a small amount of Jomini's fecund writing. Its genesis has to be seen in context with Jomini's preceding work as a distinguished historian of comparative military history.¹²² His professional standards as a military historian have been second to none at the time. He has not only witnessed himself several military campaigns as a member of the general staff, but he even interviewed other eyewitnesses of either parties; and primary sources included French, Russian and Austrian official records.¹²³ Furthermore, Jomini puts events not only in their political and socio-economic, but also in their geopolitical context before he embarks to analyse actual military campaigns.¹²⁴ Jomini grasps, indeed, the core of Beaufre's concept of total strategy when he says that 'a great empire ought to have not only a tendency to run its policy, but its economy needs a similar tendency too. The industry needs a road, like all things, in order to move and to advance.'¹²⁵ Additionally, in the chapter on military institutions discussing civil-military relations, Jomini clarifies the interrelatedness and influence of domestic and foreign politics, costs, kind of enemy, terrain, and the comparative material and moral factors, upon operational planning:

Operational planning must be in concert with the war aim, the kind of enemy one has to fight, the topography and resources of the country, and with the characters of the nations and their military and political leaders. It must be based on all material and moral means of attack or defence which the enemies may be able to bring into action; finally, it ought to take into consideration the probable alliances that may obtain in favour of or against either of the parties during the war.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Earle (1942), pp. 94-95

¹²² Colson (1998), p. 23

¹²³ Meade (1942), p. 83; Colson (1998), pp. 23-24; Langendorf (2001), p. 124; Rapin (2002), pp. 76-79

¹²⁴ Colson (1998), pp. 24; Jomini (1998), pp. 37-49; Jomini (1827) Vol. I, pp. 10-13, 30-32; Vol. II, pp. 211-212

¹²⁵ Jomini (1827) Vol. II, p. 441: 'Il faut non-seulement qu'un grand empire ait une tendance générale pour diriger sa politique, son économie doit aussi avoir une tendance pareille. Il faut une route à l'industrie, comme à toute chose, pour se mouvoir et avancer.'

¹²⁶ Jomini. (2001), p. 101: This paragraph already appears identically in *Tableau* (1830), pp. 38-57: Le système d'opération doit être en rapport avec le but de la guerre, avec l'espèce d'ennemis qu'on aura à combattre, avec la nature et les ressources du pays, avec le caractère des nations et celui des chefs qui les conduisent, soit à l'armée, soit dans l'intérieur de l'Etat. Il doit être calculé sur les moyens matériels et moraux d'attaque ou de défense que

Ever since the ascending of Clausewitz, Jomini's writing – even though its content is well absorbed in military doctrine all over the world – has often been used in a ill-balanced and polemic manner to serve hidden agendas; e.g. to please national chauvinism, or to highlight apparently contrasting ideas.¹²⁷ Recent publications on Jomini written by Bruno Colson, Jean-Jacques Langendorf, and Ami-Jacques Rapin, however, paint a more balanced picture of Jomini's legacy. Despising hegemonic powers imposing their will upon the international system of sovereign states, and advocating free trade, international regulation and moderation of armed conflict, Jomini's worldview represents what nowadays is called liberal realism.¹²⁸ In his introduction of a recently published edition of *Précis* Colson muses:

Jomini's insistence on good organisation, reasoned planning, and the importance of logistics and equipment is in tune with the complexity of Western armed forces at the outset of the 21st century when the necessity for combined and joint action is becoming more and more imperative. In this sense, Jomini might prove to apply better than his big rival, Clausewitz... . The planetary triumph of the American military system, which is more indebted to Jomini than to Clausewitz, is it not here to confirm this? Clausewitz, was he not more the theorist of national wars of the 20th century? Jomini's preference for limited wars, and his distrust of mass armies based on conscription, are they not more topical than Clausewitz's ideas of the arming of the people? Clausewitz's national romanticism, is it not outmoded and superseded by Jomini's cosmopolitan rationalism?¹²⁹

To reduce Jomini's insights to his *Précis*, or even just to his strategic principles, does him no justice. This would be the equivalent of reducing Clausewitz to his pedagogical work *Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Ergänzung meines Unterrichts bei SR*.

les ennemis peuvent avoir à opposer; enfin on doit y prendre en considération les alliances probables qui peuvent survivre pour ou contre les deux partis dans le cours de la guerre, et qui en compliqueraient les chances.'

¹²⁷ Poirier (1998), p. 435

¹²⁸ Colson (1998), p.22; Jomini (1998), pp. 37-38, 41-42; Langendorf (2001), pp. 115-116, 124, 131-132, 155

¹²⁹ Colson (2001), p. 42: 'L'insistance de Jomini sur la bonne organisation, la planification raisonnée, l'importance de la logistique et du matériel, est en phase avec la complexité des armées occidentales du début du XXI^e siècle où la nécessité de l'action interarmées et multinationale s'impose de plus en plus. En ce sens, il pourrait se révéler plus adapté même que son grand rival Clausewitz.... Le triomphe planétaire du système militaire américain, qui doit beaucoup plus à Jomini qu'à Clausewitz, n'est-il pas là pour le confirmer? Clausewitz n'était-il pas davantage le théoricien des guerres nationales du XX^e siècle? La préférence de Jomini pour des guerres limitées, sa défiance envers les armées de masses basées sur la conscription ne sont-elles pas

Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen. One grasps Jomini thinking only through comprehensive reading. Rapin states that Clausewitz's criticism of Jomini might have been a necessary step in Clausewitz's own intellectual development, and in his more ambitious search for war's absolute, regulative idea.¹³⁰ In the sense that Jomini made Clausewitz think, Jomini has definitively influenced Clausewitz. However, Clausewitz's influence on Jomini's *Précis* is twofold: 'On War' has made Jomini focus, and sharpen his ideas. Furthermore, it hardened Jomini's conviction of both, the validity and the utility of his own pragmatic approach to the science of warfare in its applied form.

plus actuelles que les idées de Clausewitz sur l'armement du peuple? Le romantisme national de Clausewitz n'est-il pas dépassé par le cosmopolitisme rationaliste de Jomini?

¹³⁰ Rapin (2002), p. 200

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¹³¹ <http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N086485> accessed 28 May 2003.

¹³² <http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N086490> accessed 28 May 2003

¹³³ <http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?O=N086494> accessed 1 June 2003

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¹³⁴ <http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N086561> accessed 28 May 2003

¹³⁵ <http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N086538> and <http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N086539> accessed 28 May 2003.

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